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TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE LEGALIZATION OF AMERICAN
LEGAL ETHIcs-I. ORIGINS

CHARLES W. WOLFRAM t
Looking across the realm of American legal ethics at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, we take it for granted that the sheer force of law strictly
constrains lawyers in many ways in their role as such. A lawyer can readily be
held personally accountable in a formal legal action and forced to provide monetary relief or undergo other remedies for a long list of lawyer wrongs committed
against a client and for many committed against a non-client. To catalogue all
the bases of relief and remedies available would be tedious, but unless the task
were done with something approaching tediousness, it would be substantially
incomplete. Remedies that are today routinely made available by statute and
common law against lawyers range widely across the law of remedies: forfeiture
of the lawyer's claim for a fee; recovery of damages for legal malpractice (bolstered by supplementary claims made on fiduciary breach or contract theories);
injunctive relief; orders compelling the lawyer's disqualification; and other damage actions or recoveries allowed under a significant number of statutory arrangements.' Moreover, it is now well established in many American jurisdictions that claimants in any and all such litigation can invoke a theory of breach
of duty that rests at least in some important way on a provision of a lawyer
2
code.
The lawyer codes themselves, of course, were designed primarily, and indeed are most frequently used, to measure the propriety of a lawyer's conduct

t Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor Emeritus, Cornell Law School This Article is a revised version of a
lecture delivered at the annual banquet of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics in Washington, D.C., on
April 9, 2001.
1. See generally Restatement of the Law Governing Lazbyers § 6 (2000) ("Restalemena) (cataloging the
most important "judicial remedies available to a client or nonclient for lawyer wrongs").
2. See id at § 52(2) and cmt f.
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for the purposes of state sanctioned professional discipline. 3 That type of legal
enforcement takes place in almost all American jurisdictions through a governmental administrative agency that dispenses professional discipline subject to
court review. 4 Professional discipline itself is a process that in most jurisdictions
is now under only the indirect control of lawyers and their bar associations.
While lawyer discipline was once scandalously under enforced5 and is still criticized by many as lax, there is no doubt that its incidence has increased significandy in the past thirty years. More than civil sanctions are involved; in recent
years, lawyers have been increasingly subject to criminal prosecution often for
violating criminal restrictions on certain activities occurring in the course of law
practice itself.6 Without a doubt, lawyers today are heavily regulated by law.
Such a level of legal regulation of lawyers was hardly inevitable at the outset
7
of the grand American experiment in constitutional self-government in 1787,
indeed it was hardly imaginable. During colonial times and for almost two hundred years after the American revolution, lawyers practiced relatively free of
anything like the intricate constraints of law that now hold lawyers fast. Indeed,
we can rest assured that if the foregoing snapshot of thorough going legal regulation of lawyers were presented to a knowledgeable lawyer-Founder in 17878 as
a reliable glimpse into the future, he9 would have recoiled in disbelief, and very
likely in horror, at the extent to which regulation several generations later would
grip the supposedly independent practice of law. Again, if the same picture were
presented near the middle of the nineteenth century to Alexis de Tocquevillethe French advocat, magistrate, statesman, and traveler-he too would have
balked at the accuracy of a description that saw the aristocrats of American soci-

3. On the discipline of lawyers generally, see Restatement, topic c, introd note (cited in note 1)(canvassing the system of professional discipline of lawyers); Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 3.1
(West 1986).
4. The structure of professional discipline that is now in place in most American jurisdictions can
be gleaned from an ABA model: ABA Model Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (1989) (amended
1999), reprinted in ABA/BNA Lanyers'Manualon ProfessionalCondud 01:601 (1999).
5. Elements of the legal profession have occasionally organized "wake-up calls" for vastly improved and more effective lawyer discipline. Perhaps the most well known was the so-called "Clark Report" named after its chairman Tom Clark, a then sitting justice of the United States Supreme Court. ABA
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations (1970)
("Clark Report').
6. See Charles W. Wolfram, Lanyer Crimes-Beond the Law?, 36 Valp U L Rev (2001) (forthcoming).
7. On the framing of the federal Constitution, see the monumental Jack N. Rakove, OriginalMeanings: Politics andIdeas in the Making of the Constitution (A.A. Knopf 1996) (Pulitzer Prize winning study).
8. More than half of the Founders were lawyers. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Histogy ofAmerican
Law 303 (Simon & Schuster 2d ed 1985).
9. All the Founders were male, and I hence refer to the mythical Founder as "he." The maleness
of Revolutionary lawyers was hardly inevitable. An historian has recently shown that many women were
lawyers in early colonial times. Many of them were fully credentialed and pursued careers as successful
practitioners. See Karen B. Morello, The Invisible Bar The Woman Lanyer m America, 1638 to the Present 3-38
(Random House 1986).
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ety0 and politics so bound by the constraints of the legal system, a system that
de Tocqueville knew the legal profession had largely molded and which they
exploited for financial reward." The same would generally hold true at the end
of the nineteenth century and indeed until well into the twentieth century.
My effort here will primarily describe the almost perfunctory legal regulation
of American lawyers' professional work in times now past.12 In a future article, I
attempt to explain the origins and immediate causes of the quite recent move to
stringent regulation. I do so primarily by outlining the limited state of professional regulation in the United States prior to a somewhat arbitrarily chosen and
quite recent year, 1970.
Lawyers practicing in the parts of the British North American colonies that
became the United States were hardly subject to regulation by law in the same
way and to the same extent that modem American lawyers are regulated. However, there are scant indications that they were not entirely immune from the
law's reach. The examples that have survived suggest that legal regulation was
episodic, almost entirely disorganized and reactive, sometimes heavy handedly
political, and perhaps readily evaded. There were, to be sure, spikes of antilawyer legislation and ordinances in the American colonies; but those were
probably merely examples of the periodic (and often opportunistic) anti-lawyer
sentiment that has beset the Anglo-American legal profession since its origins in
thirteenth-century England. 13 In short, there was little in the pre-Constitutional
period to suggest that lawyers would one day be under meaningful and constant
legal scrutiny.
Those conclusions about pre-revolutionary law practice are supportable despite the lack of high quality general history of lawyer regulation in America. The
history of lawyer regulation, even when compared to the rarely successful attempts to write good general histories of American law practice, 14 remains rela10. For a critique of de Tocqueville's claim that lawyers in mid-nineteenth-century America were
generally the "aristocrats" of society, see, for example, Robert W. Gordon, Layers as the American Aristocrag,20 Stan L Rev 2 (1985).
11. See John Leubsdorf, Man in His OriginalDigniy:Legal Ethics in France(Ashgate 2001) (citing and
critiquing de Tocqueville's views).
12. Professor Jonathan Rose has embarked on an apparently extensive research project involving
the regulation of lawyers in medieval England. The first of his excellent articles is The Legal Profession in
Medieval England A History of Regulation, 48 Syracuse L Rev 1 (1998). See also The Ambidextrous Lan'er
Conflict of Interest and the Medieval and Ear Modem Legal Profession, 7 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 137 (2000); Of
Ambidexlers and Daffidowndillies: Defamation of Lawjers, Legal Ethics, andProfessionalReputation, 8 U Chi L Sch
Roundtable 423 (2001).
13. For a recent account with interesting early American examples of anti-lawyer sentiment and
regulation, see Rose, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 116-20 (cited in note 12) (also making the point that, with periodic ebb-and-flow, anti-lawyer sentiment is centuries old).
14. The three works most often cited as general accounts of the American bar are Anton-Hermann
Chroust, The Rise of the LegalProfession in America (Oklahoma 1965); Roscoe Pound, The Layerfrom Aniqvio
to Modem Times (West 1953); and Charles Warren, A Histogy ofthe American Bar (Ittle, Brown 1911). Each
work is from somewhat to hopelessly flawed as professional history, and all have been criticized in the
writings of contemporary legal historians. (Shorter works of more impressive quality have appeared in
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tively unexplored by professional historians. The best existing general account
of the history of American lawyers, that of Professor J. Willard Hurst in The
Growth of American Law, 5 devotes over a quarter of its pages to a history of
American lawyers and their work but mentions the history of lawyer discipline
and regulation only in passing. Professor Lawrence M. Friedman devotes two
chapters to American lawyers in his monumental general history of American
law 16 and another chapter to the organized bar, 7 but again without more than
occasional and passing reference to the regulation of lawyers by law. To date,
historians of the legal profession have dipped into only some of what I suspect
is a rich lode of historical materials reflecting the ways in which the practice of
8
lawyers was regulated.'
From existing historical evidence, for the most part it appears that colonial
lawyers in their roles as such were not the object of significant regulation outside
of the process of admission to practice 9 and the occasional regulation of their

recent years and are cited below.) Pound, followed by Chroust, attempts to advance the idea of a Golden
Age in American law practice during the colonial period and immediately after the Revolution. In their
view, this era ended with calamitous decline in professional identity and public acceptance due to Jacksonian erosion of public institutions, with glory for the profession slowly reclaimed in subsequent years. No
other legal historian seems to have confirmed such a reading, although occasional writings, including some
by contemporary writers, have advanced the same general concept of a mythical past of professional lawyer
greatness from which there has since been a steep descent. See, for example, Anthony T. Kronman, The
Lost Lay'er Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard 1993); Sol M. Linowitz and Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession: Lairyering at the End of the Twentieth Century (Charles Scribner's Sons 1994). Compare Mary
Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American Society
(Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1994). While the titie and certain parts of Professor Glendon's book suggest
acceptance of the fallen lawyer theme of Kronman and Linowitz, Glendon's book is somewhat more cleareyed and not nearly as apocalyptic. Kronman's biography lists no period of law practice. See American
Association of Law Schools, Directory of Law Teachers 684 (2001). Glendon, on the other hand, began her
practicing years during the time Kronman labels as golden. Glendon recounts that it was a time of
widespread discrimination against women and Jews and of universal discrimination against other
minorities. A Nation Under Lanyers at 28, 35. Glendon's essentially conservative complaint is not so much
premised on the notion that lawyers have fallen but rather that the legal system itself has moved too far
from the conservative role that de Tocqueville spelled out as ideal for the American legal profession.
Rather than criticizing the legal profession itself, Glendon repeats a familiar complaint about perceived
activism on the part of contemporary American courts-criticism that Glendon lavishes on them in fairly
indeterminate measure. Kronman and Linowitz, to the contrary, focus their critiques on the manner in
which lawyers now conduct themselves in practicing law, a manner that they claim is tragically different
from that supposedly displayed by much of law practice at some unspecified time in the past.
15. J. Willard Hurst, The Growth ofAmerican Law: The Law Makers (Little, Brown 1950) (with chapters
12 and 13 on lawyers taking up 128 of the 446 pages of the entire text).
16. Friedman, A Histo" ofAmerican Law at chs 11-12 (cited in note 8).
17. Idatch 8.
18. See, for example, John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the Amencan Rule on Attorney Fee Recorery, 47
Law & Contemp Probs 9 (1984) (tracing the history of fee-shifting legislation and court rules in preRevolutionary America).
19. See Stephen Botein, The Legal Profession in ColonialNorth America, in Wilfrid Prest, ed, Lawgers in
Early Modern Europe and America 129, 130-33 (Croom Helm 1981) (noting development of bar admission
requirements in the early eighteenth century).

2001]

Toward a Histogy of the Legalization ofAmefican LegalEthics-I. Orgifns 473

fees.2 0 Instead, with the exception of the early Puritan colonies whose laws were
explicitly designed to be operated without the intermeddling of lawyers, 21 colonial lawyers seem to have functioned much as did the Roman jurist consults,22 if
often with mud on their boots, ruder manners, and legal matters that were much
more likely to be minor in nature.23 Particularly in the late colonial period,
American lawyers were relatively few in number (something on the order of one
lawyer to every thousand persons) 24 and primarily of the gentry class 25 They
were largely independent of the government,26 particularly as the incipient nation headed toward revolution,2 7 and certainly were not state employees. Unlike
the alleged practice of Roman jurists, they did take fees. Also quite unlike at least
the fabled high-minded operating style of Roman jurists, they were workaday
lawyers dealing with the often trivial and untidy messes left by clients and with
some transactional work primarily involving real estate and collection (mainly on
behalf of English merchants, but increasingly on behalf of community members).
In the British American colonies there was, of course, a recognized institution of professional discipline that in some of its features resembles modem
disbarment and suspension, except that the process by which it was imposed
was significantly different from modem disciplinary procedures. While no statistics exist, discipline seems to have been employed only rarely. That process and
20. See Leubsdorf, 47 Law & Contemp Probs 9 (cited in note 18).
21. See Botein, The LegalProfession in ColonialNorthAmerica at 130-33 (cited in note 19) (tracing seventeenth-century history of anti-lawyer politics in Massachusetts and colonies influenced by its model of
clergy-run government).
22. See Alan Watson and Khaled Abou E. Fadl, Fox Huntin&PheasantShootin& and Comparative Law,
48 Am J Comp L 1, 3-4 (2000) (describing the nongovernmental posture of the "law" created by the Roman jurists). See also Alan Watson, The Spiritof Roman Law 206 et seq (Georgia 1995). On the attractiveness
to early western lawyers generally of the model of the Roman lawyer, see, for example, Wilfrid Prest, Introduction, in Lanyers in Early Modem Europe andAmericaat 12 (cited in note 19). Roman lawyers such as Cicero
were endlessly quoted and much admired by colonial and post-revolutionary American lawyers. The same
as early as the sixteenth century. See Wilfrid R. Prest, The Rise of the Banisters
was true in England at least
315 (Clarendon 1986).
23. See David Lemmings, Professors of the Law: BarristersandEnglish Legal Culture in the Eighteenth Centuy 242-43 (Oxford 2000) ("Professors of the Lawl).
24. See Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law: An Introduction 267-68 (W.W. Norton rev ed 1998)
(citing data indicating that the per capita population of American lawyers at the time of the American
revolution was far lower than it would become by 1840 and that both figures were far lower than the
present ratio).
25. Early colonial lawyers apparently had less social status and occupational prestige. See generally
Friedman, A History ofAmerican Law at 94-96 (cited in note 8); Botein, The Legal Profession in ColonialNorth
America at 135-37 (cited in note 19).
26. Among other things, the colonial courts and other possible sources of British imperial influence
were generally unable or unwilling to generate sufficient legal business to keep lawyers fully occupied, well
paid, and hence of a favorable political mind. This led many lawyers, such as John Adams, to think in
explicitly calculating ways about the possibility of attracting a colonialist-based clientele by "cut[ting] a
flash" (Adams' youthful phrase to his diary) in elective politics by challenging prerogative power. See
Botein, The Legal Professionin ColonialNorthAmerica at 139 (cited in note 19).
27. See Lemmings, Professors ofthe Law at 243-47 (cited in note 23).
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its relative disuse continued after the American revolution with little variation
until well into the latter part of the twentieth century.
Not surprisingly, the method of dealing with miscreant lawyers in the colonies was borrowed by colonial courts directly from England where it was already
centuries old. English common law courts had regularly used the concept of
disbarment and imposed the sanction.28 The colonial disbarment procedure was
to continue through the 1960s with hardly any significant alteration other than
the introduction of bar associations as the complainant in the late nineteenth
century and greater attention to the requirements of due process. Aside from
those innovations, however, one viewing a disbarment proceeding in the fifth
decade of the twentieth century could have followed the proceedings rather
closely if aided by only a copy of a similar proceeding in England or British
North America from two or three centuries earlier. So close and self-conscious
was the modeling on England that one can find sprinkled throughout American
disciplinary decisions of the nineteenth century citations to decisions of English
courts, cited as if they were as authoritative as the decisions of another American jurisdiction.
A typical disbarment proceeding began with charges of misconduct contained in an order to show cause issued to the lawyer 29 complaining of more or
less specified conduct and calling on the lawyer to show cause why that conduct
should not result in the lawyer's disbarment. 30 This process was carried directly
from England where it had long been in use. The petition seeking the order
usually was required to be made under oath or at least accompanied by sworn
affidavits or similar evidence. 3' The proceeding was generally conducted as an
28. See, for example, Paul Brand, The Origins ofthe English Legal Profession ch 8 (Blackwell 1992) (recounting the system of lawyer discipline during the reign of Edward I); J.H. Baker, The English Legal Profession, 1450-1550, in Wilfrid Prest, ed, Lauyers in Eary Modern Europe and America 24 (Croom Helm 1981).
Professor Baker here recites the common tale, which might be myth, that "an attorney guilty of gross
misconduct could be put from the roll [of admitted attorneys maintained by the law courts] and physically
'cast over the bar."' Baker cites a statute from the fourth year of the reign of Henry IV but gives no citation supporting the assertion that disbarment involved both corporeal and symbolic elements.
29. However, in Walker v Commonwealth, 71 Ky 86, 1871 WL 6595 (Ky 1871), the court reversed and
remanded the judgment of a city court disbarring a lawyer in a proceeding initiated by a rule to show cause
on the ground that the proper method of proceeding when the lawyer's conduct did not occur in the presence of the court was by "complaint or information." Id at *6.
30. See, for example, In re Peny, 36 NY 651 (NY 1867) (stating that proceeding to strike lawyer
from roll of attorneys and counselors of court was properly begun by order to show cause founded on
papers presenting charges); Saxton v Stowell, 11 Paige Ch 526 (NY Ch 1845) (describing show-cause procedures required by statute). See generally Edward Weeks, Attomys and Counsellors at Law § 83 at 155 (S.
Whitney 1878) (stating that the show-cause order for lawyer discipline was common law procedure used in
both American and British courts). The ancient common law show-cause order system remains in use in
federal courts as a means of initiating discipline of lawyers. See, for example, In re Lghfoot, 217 F3d 914,
915 (7th Cir 2000) (noting how disciplinary proceedings, here unusually against a federal prosecutor, had
been initiated by such an order).
31. See, for example, Expare Burr, 22 US (9 Wheat) 529, 530 (1824) (memorandum op) (holding
that while "the charges, in a regular complaint against an attorney, ought not to be received and acted on,
unless made on oath[,]" the requirement of an oath here was waived).
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equity suit or more specifically as a contempt proceeding. Most importantly, that
meant that the court invariably tried charges without a jury.32 Despite the suggestion in the writ, the lawyer was required to respond to the charges in the
usual way of a civil litigant and the petitioning party was required to prove its
case with evidence. The proceeding sometimes entailed appointment of a committee of lawyers 33 or a referee instructed to conduct an investigation and file a
report. The disbarment proceedings would then end with an order entered by a
judge or sometimes all the judges of a multiple-judge court. Once charges were
established, the customary sanction was disbarment with some decisions imposing a period of suspension for offenses perceived as less egregious. Lesser sanctions were quite rare with some courts denying that they possessed the power to
impose any sanction less than suspension.34 The severity of the sanction itself
would suggest that many courts would be reluctant to impose it except in extreme situations.
A variation on the typical show-cause disbarment proceeding was a summary proceeding to disbar in contempt, the distinguishing hallmark being the
absence of a formal notice of charges or much of an opportunity to defend on
the part of the lawyer. Contempt disbarment was available when the lawyer's
wrongful acts were committed in the presence of the court, a somewhat elastic
concept.35 The contempt disbarment procedure was apparently rarely used, to
the lament of at least one court. 36 In some states, nonetheless, summary disbarment without notice or hearing would follow after a criminal conviction of a
37
lawyer.
32. That was not invariably true. Texas has historically provided for jury trial in all civil matters, including disbarment and other lawyer-disciplinary proceedings. See Hanners v State Bar, 860 SW2d 903, 911
(Tex Civ App 1993) (noting Texas statutory bar on abolition of jury trial in lawyer-disciplinary proceedings). The same is true in Georgia by court rule. See Georgia Bar Rule 4-214.
33. The lawyers would be appointed as court functionaries, "commissioners," or the like. See, for
example, In re Kirby, 73 NW 92, 93 (SD 1897) (describing statute setting up such a referral to a "committee
of three reputable attorneys and counselors" with judgment to be entered on their report).
34. See, for example, Expa'e Mason, 43 P 651, 653 (Or 1896) (distinguishing British authority and
holding that lawyer convicted of misdemeanor of criminal libel could not be issued mere admonition but
must be either suspended or disbarred).
35. See, for example, ExparteBurr, 4 F Cas 791, 794 (CCD DC 1823), aff'd on other grounds, 22
US (9 Wheat) 529 (1824) (stating that court will provide summary attachment for contempt of an opposing
lawyer at the request of a party injured "for... gross and palpable abuses" "except only in his way of
business as attorney, but will leave the party to his ordinary remedy by action [otherwise]').
36. Rice v Commonwealtb, 57 Ky 472, 482,1857 WL 4418 at *8 (Ky 1857) (stating, in course of affirming summary disbarment of lawyer who had stood by while a document that he knew to be forged was
offered into evidence by co-counsel, that courts have the duty to make summary charges against lawyer
committing official misconduct; "it is much to be regretted that this duty, which the law devolves upon the
courts of the country, is so little regarded, and that the obligations which it imposes are so frequently
overlooked or neglected.").
37. See, for example, In re Bloor, 52 P 779 (Mont 1898) (per curiam) ('We believe no complaint or
accusation in writing is necessary where an attorney and counselor has been convicted of a felony, or a
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and where the record of conviction has been duly certified to this
court.... ').

476

Roundtable

[8:469

In the more typical procedure, the papers seeking an order to show cause
were filed by a lawyer or group of lawyers 38 or a judge before whom allegedly
offensive conduct had occurred. Bar associations as known in the late nineteenth and twentieth century did not exist in colonial times. At most, early lawyer organizations were mainly social dubs; involvement of bar associations or
standing bar committees in professional discipline became common only near
the end of the nineteenth century and in some states not until well into the
twentieth. 39 Those later proceedings were brought by bar associations as the
recognized and authoritative prosecutorial body. The individual lawyers and
informal "bars" that filed disbarment proceedings in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were more likely volunteers, perhaps serving at the behest of a
judge or following a complaint from a disgruntled client or adversary.
Disbarment had a severe drawback in colonial America. Despite the absence
of jury trials, centering the discipline of lawyers in colonial courts incurred a
built in regulatory limitation because of the local politics of colonialism. The
royal courts in all colonies were widely viewed in local communities as the willing instruments of an oppressive, distant and oblivious set of royal ministers.
Thus, in all but clear cases of lawyer skullduggery attempts to discipline lawyers-as with other attempts to impose legal constraints on the restless colonists-must have had at best a mixed professional and popular reception. Indeed, in their chronically heavy handed way, the Crown's colonial representatives seem to have resorted to disbarment more than occasionally to punish or
neutralize lawyers who were perceived as politically out-of-step or otherwise
uncooperative. Such was the fate, for example, of John Adams' good friend and
fellow patriot Joseph Hawley, a leader of the patriot party in western Massachusetts who was disbarred (but as it turned out only temporarily) for publishing
newspaper attacks on the royal judges.40 Such attempts to discipline lawyers
must have aroused at least as much colonist sympathy as they did political approbation for colonial administrators. Thus, throughout most of the colonial
period, able administrators and judges would have appreciated that a disbarment
proceeding brought in any but a clear case of lawyer misconduct and of a kind

38. Early disbarment proceedings were sometimes initiated by a petition filed by an impromptu
meeting of members of the bar of a court preferring charges against a colleague. See, for example, Beene v
Slate, 22 Ark 149, 157 (Ark 1860) (describing such a process).
39. In some states, there was resistance by courts to apparently volunteer efforts by nascent bar associations to become involved in lawyer discipline matters. See, for example, In re McCarthy; 51 NW 963
(Mich 1879) (suggesting that a disciplinary proceeding involving a lawyer convicted of a felony "had nothing to do with" the bar association of respondent's city, a committee of which had brought the disbarment
proceeding).
40. L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds, 1 Legal Papers ofJobn Adams ci (1965), citing E. Francis Brown and Joseph Hawley, Colonial Radical (NY 1931). According to the charges against him, Hawley
was disbarred for newspaper publications during the late 1760s that "contain[ed] divers injurious and
scandalous Reflections on several of the Justices of this Court, for what they did in Court, and as Justices
thereof." Id. Hawley was readmitted to practice after promising future good behavior.
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likely to be condemned by all shades of political opinion would incur an unacceptable risk of further estranging the colonials. Probably for that reason, professional discipline seems to have been generally reserved for cases of thorough
going lawyer scoundrels. 41
That limitation was removed with the independence gained through the
American revolution. However, there was no detectable increase in the disci-

pline of lawyers in the new post-revolutionary states, 42 despite the fact that the
number of lawyers increased dramatically in the first half of the nineteenth century.43 In fact, rapid growth in the number of lawyers suggests that the informal
controls lawyers formerly exerted over their colleagues (and hence over such
matters as admission to practice) were substantially weakened. There were no
activist bar associations or similar prosecutorial agencies that stood ready to
sustain a disciplinary charge through to an order of disbarment. Prosecution
thus required a highly motivated volunteer lawyer or judge to press the charges
pro bonopublico,although several decisions suggest that courts in some states were
able to invoke the aid of a public prosecuting attorney.44
In addition to the show-cause type of disbarment, which was by far the
most common, at least two other types of disbarment proceedings were known,
at least in some jurisdictions during some periods of time. First, in apparently
rare instances, a court would impose disbarment as a sanction for contempt following only summary proceedings, which would not always provide the lawyer
an opportunity to be heard prior to imposition of the disbarment order.45 There
are indications that such contempt disbarments were regarded more as punishment for a specific offensive act rather than as a long-term matter, which might
have made it equivalent to disbarment after the customarily more elaborate pro-

cedures were provided. 46 One may also speculate that other courts might have
hesitated to take such disbarments at face value because of the possible hotblooded reaction of the sanction-imposing judge as a human consequence of
having witnessed---or worse having been the object of-the lawyer's outrageous
41. See Botein, The Legal Professionin ColonialNorhAmerica at 129 (cited in note 19).
42. It goes without saying in the text, but it was fundamental to the ensuing scheme of lawyer regulation that disciplinary jurisdiction was universally assumed in post-revolutionary times to be the business
of the states and not the federal government.
43. See Friedman, American Law at 268 (cited in note 24).
44. See, for example, In re Paakiki, 8 Haw 518 (Hawaii 1892) (indicating that the deputy attorney
general had served as the lawyer on motion to show cause).
45. See, for example, Randall v Brigham, 74 US (7 Wall) 523, 540 (1868) (Field in dictum) (disbarment "proceedings against attorneys for malpractice, or any unprofessional conduct" may be taken without
notice and opportunity to be heard "for matters occurring in open court, in the presence of the judges"); In
re Campbell,2 Haw 27 (Hawaii 1857) (denying motion to vacate summary order disbarring lawyer held in
contempt for writing libelous letter to judge in a pending proceeding).
46. Compare, for example, Ex PareTillingbast,29 US 108 (1830) (memorandum op) (admitting lawyer to practice before United States Supreme Court despite disbarment for contempt in federal court in the
Northern District of New York, on ground that Supreme Court should not "punish" lawyer again for
single offense).
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conduct. Some nineteenth-century courts refused to permit such summary disciplinary proceedings at all.47 Today, of course, summary proceedings of the
kind found in many of those earlier decisions would undoubtedly be set aside
because they lacked due process in the absence of constitutionally mandatory
notice and an opportunity to be heard. The second type of disbarment was private lidigant disbarment. That was found, apparently, only in Kentucky under a
nineteenth-century statute empowering a client that sued a lawyer for return of
the client's funds to have the trial court enter an order that the lawyer be sus48
pended from law practice until he repaid the adjudicated debt.
The major restraint, the show-cause disbarment proceeding, was subject to
the ever present problem of geographical limitations on the powers of courts.
Given the possibilities for (westward) migration, a scoundrel lawyer could evade
a serious threat of discipline by quickly moving beyond the jurisdiction of the
court in which the lawyer was admitted before the proceeding was started. Initiating the order to show cause proceeding, as with any civil proceeding, required
serving process on the subject lawyer locally. Flight after such service could lead
to a default judgment of disbarment, but flight ahead of the process server
would frustrate the proceeding.49 Flight would successfully foil discipline because of a peculiarity that survives, although in altered form, in most states to
this day. Admission in one state was, and is, limited to that state and only that
state.5 0 In fact, in some states admission was on a county-by-county basis.51 The
entire (and only) point of a disbarment proceeding was to strip away that status
as an admitted lawyer. Thus, successful evasion on the part of an accused lawyer
might entail nothing more than removing to an adjoining county or state, or
farther away depending on local rules on service of process. Unlike debts left
behind, which could be forwarded for collection to any place where the migratory debtor could be found,5 2 in some states charges of professional misconduct
were not similarly portable "choses in action. '5 3 The states bore such limitations
47.

See, for example, Beene, 22 Ark at 157 (insisting that whether discipline is sought for violations

under disbarment statute or for acts committed in the presence of the court usual procedures of show-

cause order and opportunity to respond must be followed).
48. See Wilson vPopham, 15 SW 859 (Ky 1891).
49. That much has now changed. Under procedural rules used in modern lawyer discipline, a failure
to serve a lawyer admitted locally can be supplemented by other forms of notification, such as mailing
notice to the lawyer's last known place of business or residence. Such substituted service suffices to initiate
modern discipline. See generally ABA Model Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 13(A) (cited
in note 4).
50. I explore the history and illogic of the survival of such geographically determined disciplinary
jurisdictions in Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-of-State Lajgers, 30 Hofstra L Rev (2001)

(forthcoming).
51. See Clark Report at 157 (cited in note 5) (reporting ability of lawyer disbarred in one county to
practice in neighboring county).
52. Collection of such forwarded debts was a significant part of the work of frontier lawyers. See
Friedman, A Histog ofAmerican Law at 642 (cited in note 8).
53. See Clark Report at 106-09 (cited in note 5) (reporting problem in several states as late as the
1960s of disciplinary systems without power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer without
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on their power over lawyers for a very long time. The concerned jurisdiction
was apparently content with the thought that any repetition of the outrage by
the same miscreant lawyer on the lam would at least not occur locally.
The substantive grounds on which post-revolutionary lawyers might be disciplined remained much as they had prior to independence. Reliance was placed
primarily upon what the courts uniformly projected as a community-ide sense
of decorum and good character, instead of the modem emphasis upon a codal
formulation of all grounds for lawyer discipline. In the first place it was important that before and for over a hundred years after the revolution there were no
"codes" of prohibited and permitted conduct. Courts would occasionally refer
to the oath required of lawyers on admission to the bar, 4 but those oaths were
invariably quite general in form 55 and could hardly have provided either guidance to a questioning lawyer or restraint on a court inclined otherwise to impose

discipline.
The first lawyer code with any possible disciplinary relevance was the 1908
ABA Canons of Ethics.5 6 In some post-revolutionary states, a lawyer who
looked might find a statute proscribing certain conduct. However, invariably the
statute provided only a very general warning, such as the proscription in a New
York statute against "any deceit, malpractice, crime or misdemeanor '57 or the
condemnation in a 1715 Maryland statute of "any indecent liberties to the lessening of the grandeur and authority of the [magistrate's] respective courts."5 8
Courts refused to read a statutory specification of grounds as an implied limitation on what they conceived to be their broad and ample common law powers
to impose discipline on lawyers.5 9 Jurisdictions seem to have contented themlocal service of process). Again if the admitting jurisdiction could entertain jurisdiction and an order of
disbarment was entered, the order could be given extra-jurisdictional force, as by a requirement in several
states that a lawyer moving for admission based on admission in another state was required to swear or
otherwise prove that he had not been the subject of a disbarment order elsewhere. See, for example, Ex re/
Blaekmerv Campbell,58 P 591 (Colo 1899) (ordering disbarment of lawyer who falsely swore that he had not
been disbarred by any court of record in which he was admitted).

54. See, for example, Leigb's Case, 15 Va 468,1810 WL 547 (Va 1810).
55. See, for example, Bank of New York v Sltyker, 1 Wheeler Cr Cas 330, 333 (NY Sup Ct 1816)
("every lawyer takes the oath of office, which is, that he will truly and honestly demean himself in the
practice of an attorney, solicitor, or counsel, as the case may be. If he acts otherwise, he falsifies his oath,
and ought to be struck from the rolls. He cannot afterwards be believed.').

56.
57.

See p. 484 below.
In irPery, 36 NY at 653 (describing grounds stated in NY Code of Civil Procedure for disbar-

ment or suspension of lawyer). See also, for example, BarAssn of Boston v Greenbood,46 NE 568, 574 (Mass
1897) (quoting Massachusetts statute empowering court to discipline lawyer for "any deceit, malpractice, or

other gross misconduct.").
58.

See Laws of the Colony of Maryland ch 48 § 12 (1715), cited and quoted in Expare Burr, 4 F

Cas at 793. See also, for example, Pa Act of April 14, 1834, cited and quoted in Exparte Steinman, 95 Pa
220, 237 (1880) (Chief Justice Sharswood's opinion quoting a statute providing for disbarment or suspension of a lawyer who "shall misbehave himself in his office of attorney').
59. See, for example, Expare Wall, 107 US 265 (1883); Beene, 22 Ark at 157 (citing authority) (stating that apparently "in the exercise of its inherent power" "where a statute enumerates certain offences for
which an attorney may be disbarred, it does not exclude the power of the court to strike them from the roll
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selves with the position that no more precise specification of prohibited wrongs

was necessary because a lawyer of suitable learning and character would be well
aware of what was permitted and prohibited. Proper professional deportment
was something that was thought to accompany virtue, or at least something to
be learned during apprenticeship to a reputable lawyer. Such a period of "reading law" was the method by which the great majority of lawyers prepared for
admission until after the Civil War, when most of the oldest law schools were
founded. Procedurally, however, courts usually required greater specificity in the
charges filed in individual cases, obviously to provide the accused lawyer ade-

60
quate notice of the nature of the evidence that would be brought forward.
With respect to the grounds for discipline that actually produced sanctions,
well into the twentieth century most court decisions on professional discipline
of lawyers sort into two short stacks. In one stack are disbarment proceedings
brought after the lawyer was convicted in the criminal courts of a serious offense. 61 Disbarment would be sought because of the conviction, presumably
based on the underlying conduct but with some apparent confusion over

whether the fact of conviction alone (and hence regardless of the underlying
conduct) was not the chief wrong because of the embarrassment caused to the
bench and bar by the conviction itself. That view is supported by the many decisions refusing to consider a petition to disbar a lawyer for criminal acts until the

63
lawyer was indicted and convicted of the crime. 62 As with the modern view,
the lawyer-defendant would not be permitted in the disciplinary proceeding to
controvert facts of the offense that had been found against the lawyer in the
criminal proceeding. 64 In fact, disciplinary materials from colonial times until

for other sufficient causes not embraced in the statute"); BarAssn of Boston, 46 NE at 574 (citing authority)

(even if statutory grounds could be construed narrowly, "[i]t has been held in other jurisdictions that similar statutes do not take away the jurisdiction at common law to remove an attorney for causes not included
in the statute, such as ceasing to be of good moral character, within the meaning of these words as used in
a statute prescribing the requirements for admission to the bar"); In reMills, 1 Mich 392, 395-96 (Mfich
1850) (same).
60. An obviously problematical test case was In reMills, 1 Mich at 398. The Michigan Supreme
Court first held that a charge against a lawyer that he was "of notoriously bad character" was too general:
"Specific acts should be charged, so as to give the respondent an opportunity of answering them." Id. But
the court went on to hold that the charging papers contained a sufficiently specific charge that the "reputation of [the lawyer] for truth and veracity is so notoriously bad that he is not to be believed under oath."
Id.
61. See, for example, In re Kirby, 73 NW 92 (SD 1897) (disbarment of lawyer following conviction
for felony of receiving property of the United States with intent to convert it for his own use).
62. See, for example, Exparte Wall, 107 US 265 (1883) (based on extensive review of American and
British authorities stating that absent unusual circumstances requiring earlier disposition, the court will not
entertain discipline charges amounting to allegation of a serious crime before the lawyer is criminally prosecuted); In reWellcome, 58 P 45, 47 (Mont 1899) (same); In reAnonmous, 7 NJL 162 (NJ 1824) (refusing to
entertain application for disbarment on that ground although suggesting a different approach if the allegedly criminal acts (here larceny) constituted contempt of court or "malpractice").
63. Restatement at § 5, cmt 9 (cited in note 1).
64. See generally Edward P. Weeks, Attorney and Counsellors at Law 162, 166 (2d ed 1892).
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1970 seem to reveal that cases of conviction-then-disbarment constituted a large
percentage of all disciplinary proceedings. The crimes, naturally, ranged widely
from murder, robbery, and similarly outrageous offenses-with many of the
offenses stemming from fraud and theft65 -to occasional but controversial allegations involving either politics or personal beliefs. 66 As with the modem view, a
lawyer's acquittal, satisfaction of a sentence, or pardon did not prevent the maintenance of a disbarment proceeding involving conduct that also constituted a
67
criminal offense.
The second and apparently less common type of disciplinary offense involved not a prior criminal conviction but grounds that, in most instances, both
contemporaries and modems would agree constituted plainly outrageous behavior of a similarly repugnant nature, notwithstanding that no conviction had (at
least yet) been obtained. 68 Bear in mind that for most of this period and in most
places, there were no limitations on lawyer advertising or solicitation. Fixation
on those matters of business competition came only in the twentieth century
with the arrival of lawyer codes. Thus, the non-conviction offenses involved
more dearly outrageous lawyer conduct, including much conduct that could
(and perhaps later did) lead to the lawyer's criminal conviction. Illustrative examples include the 1672 disbarment of a Maryland lawyer for falsifying a court's
writ; 69 the 1832 disbarment of a New York lawyer for forging a court order that
65. See, for example, In reMCathy, 51 NW 963 (Mich 1879) (lawyer disbarred after conviction for
obtaining money under false pretenses); Exparte Thompson, 52 P 570 (Or 1898) (lawyer disbarred following
conviction for felony of larceny by bailee); Expare Steinman, 95 Pa at 237 (stating that despite arguably
narrower wording of statute on discipline of lawyers, power to disbar could exist if lawyer "was proved to
be a thief, a forger, a perjurer or guilty of other offences of the crimenfas").
66. See, for example, In re Paakiki,8 Haw at 520-21 (although lawyer held not subject to discipline
for aiding and abetting forgery and perjury on refusal to credit testimony of convicted clients, court imposed two year suspension on finding that lawyer's persistence in pressing genuineness of instrument was
"suspicious"). On non-criminal charges of a similarly problematical nature, which in both cited instances
were reversed on appeal, see, for example, Exparte Biggs, 64 NC 202, 1870 WL 1710 at *6 (1870) (reversing
contempt sanctions of disbarment against lawyer-newspaper editor that were imposed by a sarcastic report
of the judge's charge to the grand jury, noting similarity of the charge to an earlier charge the judge made
to different grand jury with an exception: "His Honor seems to have somewhat deserted the service of the
profane poetical masters, and confined most of his quotations to the Holy Scriptures-a happy omen, if it
is possible to believe anything happy in such a character.'); Expate Steinman, 95 Pa 220 (1880) (trial judge's
order to disbar lawyer-newspaper editors, who had accused a judge of political partisanship in acquitting
criminally accused persons of his own political party, vacated on finding that newspaper statements were
protected under state constitution).
67. See, for example, Ex rel
ColoradoBarAssn v Weeber, 57 Pac 1079, 1080 (Colo 1899) (so holding
while citing authority from several states); In reAnonmous, 86 NY 563, 569-72 (1881).
68. Just as it was true that a pardon, acquittal, or similar basis did not preclude disbarment, it was
also held in many decisions that criminal conviction was not a necessary condition for discipline based on
acts that would also constitute a crime. See, for example, Exparte Tyler, 40 P 33 (Cal 1895) (citing authority).

69. Chroust, I The Rise of the Legal Profession in America at 248 n 44 (cited in note 14). See also, for
example, Expatte Brown, 2 Miss 303 (Miss 1836) (lawyer disbarred for mutilating declaration of opposing
litigant to insure liability to a motion to dismiss and for antedating client's writ in another case to avoid a
statute of limitations defense).
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enabled a husband to convince his wife that they were legally divorced;70 the
1889 suspension of a Wisconsin lawyer for two years for, among other things,
instigating a suit seeking his former client's land after the latter had rebuffed the
lawyer's demand for additional fees for securing the title to the same land;7' and
the 1898 disbarment of a Minnesota lawyer for altering tax records in order to
further litigation on behalf of his clients. 72 A recurring non-criminal complaint
73
of judges was that a cited lawyer repeatedly filed unfounded litigation.
Again there were disciplinary attempts that would strike many modems as
problematical if not outrageous, 7 4 such as the 1639 disbarment of Thomas Lechford in the rigidly Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay for attempting to plead
according to the common law rather than the Ten Commandments. 75 In fact,
lawyer discipline opened a highly symbolic melodrama of resistance to British
colonial authorities that was almost as celebrated as the Boston Tea Party. In
1735, New York City judge James DeLancey disbarred lawyers William Smith
and James Alexander, who were defending the printer John Peter Zenger in one
76
of the most notorious political trials of colonial North America.
Lawyers could also, of course, be held liable for damages or other types of
civil relief in a suit by a client or (rarely) by a non-client. Again, with the excep70. In re Peterson, 3 Paige Ch 510, 512 (NY Ch 1832). See also, for example, In re Anonymous, 2 Cow
589 (NY Sup Ct 1824) (lawyer subjected to body attachment and ordered suspended from practice unless
he paid all costs of action that he commenced without having been retained to do so).
In re 0, 42 NW 221, 226 (Wis 1889) (disbarment by trial court on conflict and other grounds
71.
reduced to suspension in view of youth of accused lawyer, small sums involved and "the confidence entertained of his reformation").
72. In re Nunn, 76 NW 38 (Minn 1898) (disbarment on noted facts after taking of evidence by referee appointed by Supreme Court).
73. For example, during the late nineteenth century it was apparently a practice among some Nebraska lawyers for debtors to remove mortgage foreclosure actions from state to federal courts on the
assertion that "on account of prejudice and local influence" a fair hearing could not be had in state courts,
where the unfairness alleged was the refusal of the state courts to enforce a then repealed state statute that
formerly had provided for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing mortgagor. See, for example, In re
Breckenridge, 48 NW 142, 143 (Neb 1891) (on application for disbarment, imposing lesser sanction of admonition on finding that "several other attorneys seem to have done the same thing" and observing that
this was a case of first impression).
74. Among other examples, see 1 Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America at 199 (cited in
note 14) (suspension of Thomas Gordon in Province of New Jersey by Governor Combury in 1707 for
opposition to governor, with reinstatement the following year under the successor governor).
75. Warren, A History of the American Bar at 68-69 (cited in note 14) (describing how Lechford was
"debarred" "for going to the Jewry bury] and pleading with them out of court," with Lechford being readmitted after he "acknowledged he had overshot himself, and was sorry for it, promised to attend to his
calling, and not to meddle with controversies.").
76. Chroust, 1 The Rise of the Legal Profession in America at 169 (cited in note 14). Lawyers Smith and
Alexander had attacked the validity of DeLancey's appointment as judge a short time earlier. Id at 169-70.
On the John Peter Zenger affair, see generally Eben Moglen, ConsideringZenger: PartisanPolitics and the Legal
Profession in ProvincialNew York, 94 Colum L Rev 1495 (1994). The disbarment of Smith and Alexander and
the then very small size of the bar in New York City, even when at full strength, necessitated bringing in
Philadelphia lawyer Andrew Hamilton as Zenger's defense attorney. Hamilton's mythic fame in winning
Zenger's acquittal (from a friendly jury of like-minded colonists) gave rise to the expression "Philadelphia
lawyer," still heard (if rarely) today when referring to an extremely able lawyer.

2001]

Towarda Histoy of the LegaiZaion ofAmeican LegalEthics-I. Orgins 483

tion of dear lawyer wrongdoing, such litigation seems to have been sparse until
1970. The general outline of a legal malpractice remedy was recognized rather
early; the first reported decision employing a relatively modem doctrine to define the tort of legal malpractice came in a 1796 decision of the Virginia Supreme Court.7 7 Nonetheless, it appears that the law of legal malpractice and
other bases of possible lawyer liability developed largely within the broader context of tort and contract law.78 In justifying legal malpractice awards, many
courts in the latter part of the nineteenth century employed vocabulary that
resonates more with notions of contract than with notions of relationship, unreasonable risk, or similar tort concepts. 79 During this period, explanations of
lawyer duties or liability generally contained limited judicial discussion of "fiduciary duties" and similarly lofty concepts, in contrast to more general talk in
lawyer-liability opinions earlier in the century.8 0 That probably reflects a lack of
the same kind of intense self-consciousness and pervasive "professional" awareness that now permeates not only bar associations but also much judicial con-

versation about the legal implications of lawyering.
In general, tort and contract remedies against lawyers remained comparatively dormant well past the middle of the twentieth century, at least when
measured by today's statistics. The strategic situation confronting a client considering litigation against a former lawyer would have been daunting. Some
commentators assert that a pervasive and well observed "conspiracy of silence"
among lawyers allowed them to refuse to serve as either plaintiff's counsel or as
77. Stephens v White, 2 Va 203 (Va 1796) (affirming judgment for plaintiff against defendant lawyer
who had caused client's lawsuit to be thrown out for failure to file a proper paper). See also, for example,
Gilbert v Williams, 8 Mass 51, 1811 WL 1671 at *5 (Mass 1811) (ordering judgment for client against his
former counsel for "unreasonable neglect, and a consequent loss, for which the defendant is accountable"
for lawyer's failure to follow client's instructions on how to collect a debt).
78. Courts acknowledged as much. See, for example, Holmes v Peck, 1 RI 242, 245 (RI 1849) ('We
recognize the principle, which subjects an Attorney for the want of ordinary skill and care in the management of the business entrusted to him, as any one else, who professes any other art or mystery.').
79. See Hurst, The Growth of Amedcan Law at 330 (cited in note 15): "The nineteenth-century cases
regarding lawyers' liability for bad advice or mishandling of affairs sought a rationalizing principle. They
found it more often in what they interpreted to be the terms of the contract of service between lawyer and
client, than they did in the incidents of a professional relationship ....
The stress on the lawyer-client
contract, rather than on the lawyer-client relationship, was consistent with the disappearance during most
of the nineteenth century of any strong or disciplined sense of corporate existence and responsibility in 'the
bar'; it fitted into the pattern of a diminished sense of the social responsibility of the profession."
80. Frequently cited is the lofty statement of a lawyer's duty in Stockton v Ford, 52 US 232, 247
(1850) ("There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of
attorney and client, or, generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the
court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.").
See also, for example, Cox v Sullivan, 7 Ga 144, 146 (Ga 1849) (describing action for legal malpractice: 'The
plaintiff's ight of action grows out of the relation which the law has established between client and attorney.'); id at 147 (lawyer collecting note for client "is bound to the highest honor and integiy, to the utmost
good faith" (emphasis in original)).
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an expert witness for the client. 81 Even if no such conspiracy existed, it is doubtful whether many additional malpractice cases would have been brought. Even if
a plaintiff's lawyer and expert82 could have been found to testify for the plaintiff,

because few states officially adopted the 1908 ABA Canons as a mandatory lawyer code 83 until jurisdictions began to adopt lawyer codes modeled on the 1969
ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct, most possible malpractice claims
would have devolved into open-ended swearing matches between experts. Further, the money was not there in most cases. Lawyers were not economically
motivated to sue one another. To be sure, the contingent fee was sufficiently
well accepted in many states by the beginning of the twentieth century to have
given rise to a significant plaintiffs' bar.84 However, the prospect of significant
reward to a lawyer suing another lawyer was absent. In addition to possible loss
of referrals from other lawyers, a lawyer contemplating suing another must have
appreciated that most lawyers were hardly "deep pocket" defendants. Until recent decades, the vast majority of lawyers practiced without legal malpractice
insurance,85 and few lawyers had either professional or personal assets of a magnitude that would have warranted strenuous and expensive effort to recover a
substantial judgment.
No very significant change occurred in lawyer regulation with the adoption
of the first lawyer code, the ABA Canons of Ethics, in 1908. About the same
time, some local bars were also adopting codes of professional ethics. Henry S.
Drinker, in his LegalEthics (1953), lists eleven states that had adopted such codes
prior to the ABA's adoption of its Canons of Ethics in 190886 and several more
in which such codes were then under active consideration. 87 Those codes, including the 1908 Canons, were closely modeled on the Alabama code adopted in
1887. Drinker lists a number of additional states as also having enacted "codes
of ethics,"88 but the sources to which he refers bore little resemblance to at least
81.
While impossible to document statistically, commentators have assumed the existence of such a
"conspiracy." See, for example, Modem Legal Ethics at 207 (cited in note 3); Joseph C. Goulden, The Million
DollarLanyers243-44 (1981).
82. The two could not have been the same. A rule that has been enforced with rigor for all of the
twentieth century is the "advocate-witness" prohibition against a lawyer testifying in an action in which the
lawyer (or formerly a member of the lawyer's firm) appeared as advocate. See generally Restatement at § 99
(cited in note 1).
83. See Modern Legal Ethics 5 2.6.2 at 55-56 (cited in note 3) (noting lack of official force of 1908
Canons except in the few states where court rule or, more rarely, decision made them binding on lawyers).
84. Acceptance of the contingent fee in the United States was fairly general by the end of the nineteenth century. See, for example, Edward Weeks, A Treatise on Attornys and Counsellors at Law 717 (2d ed
1892). Maine, the last state to prohibit contingent fees, repealed its prohibitory statute only in 1965. See
Modern Legal Ethics at 527 (cited in note 3).
85. See Modem Legal Etbhics at 240 (cited in note 3) (stating that except for a few firms that obtained
legal malpractice insurance through Lloyds of London such insurance was unknown in the United States
prior to the Second World War).

86.

Id at 23.

87.
88.

Id at 24.
Id.

2001]

Toward a History of the LegaliZation ofAmeican LegalEthics-I. Ogins 485

the specificity of the Canons (to the limited extent to which the Canons can be
so described). Those other "codes" were nothing more than a perfunctory and
non-specific list of lawyer duties contained in the oath of admission prescribed
by statute. Many of the oaths Drinker lists were based on the lawyer's oath set
out in S 511 of the so-called Field Code of procedure, first recommended (but
not adopted by the state legislature) in New York in 1850.89 The New York
commission report indicates that the drafters translated the oath from the prescribed oath for advocates in the Canton of Geneva, lineage that Drinker acknowledges although he does not mention its more proximate source in the
Field Code. The Field Code was widely influential and copied in the middle of
the nineteenth century, particularly in California90 and other western states that
based their procedural law on that of California.
The chief motivation for the ABA's adoption of the 1908 Canons was
probably status seeking by the elite lawyers who constituted the minuscule
membership of the ABA. There are indications that the ABA also intended the
Canons to have an influence (if not direct application) in lawyer disciplinary
actions. 91 Only slowly did the Canons gain much currency as an enforceable
specification of explicit grounds for discipline. 92 It was rare for the Canons to be
invoked in other kinds of litigation against lawyers, even in the rare instance of a
disqualification motion. The American Bar Association itself was founded only
in 1878, and then only as part (and hardly the first example) of a national and
uniquely American phenomenon in which many occupational groups organized
national associations to advance their interests, particularly, it seems, their social
prestige. 93 Much like the few bar organizations that existed in colonial and postrevolutionary times (and then died out),94 the ABA until well into the twentieth
century functioned mainly as an exclusive social fraternal organization of highstatus lawyers rather than as a broadly representative and unofficial regulatory
body. Local bar associations such as the Association of the Bar of the City of

89. See Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, Code of Civil Procedure 204-05
(1850) (setting out recommended statutory lawyer's oath of admission to practice).
90. See Cal Code Civ Proc § 282 (1872) (provision in California procedural code copying Field
Codes § 511 lawyer's oath of admission).
91. See Simeon E. Baldwin, The New Ameiican Code of LegalEthics, 8 Col L Rev 541, 546 (1908) (article by former ABA president stating that "[t]he courts will hesitate less in enforcing the discipline of the
bar, since professional misconduct will be, more than ever before, a sinning against the light."). For some
decades after the ABA promulgated the Canons, most decisions held that a charge of failure to abide by
one of the Canons was not a sufficient ground for disbarment. See, for example, In re Clifton, 196 P 670
(Idaho 1921) (refusing to enforce ABA Canons); Ringen v Ranes, 104 NE 1023, 1025 (I1 1914). Compare
Hunterv Troup, 146 NE 321, 324 (Il 1925) (lawyer may be disciplined for not observing Canons).
92. See Modem LegalEthics at 55-56 (cited in note 3).
93. See id at 34; John A. Matzko, 'The Best Men of the Bar'". The Foundingof the American BarAssociaion, in Gerard W. Gawalt, ed, The New Higb Priests: Laigers in Post-Civil War America 75, 79 (Greenwood
1984).
94. Id.
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New York, which predated the ABA by several years, 95 supported and even
participated as prosecutor in certain disbarment proceedings, but that activity
seems to have produced, at most, episodic spikes of disciplinary activity by local
bar associations that died down as a particular "crisis" perceived by the local bar
had passed or was superceded on the bar's agenda by what was perceived to be
more pressing business. 96 For the most part, discipline of lawyers remained relatively rare, as it had been for a very long time in the United States97 and as was
also the case during comparable periods in England. 98
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, a judgment whether lawyer regulation through professional discipline and civil remedies was extensive in pre-1970 America seems discernible.
Lawyers in general were at small risk of discipline or civil litigation with respect
to their professional work. While forms of relief (or, as they would have been
called prior to the 1930s, causes of action) were established and even fairly well
developed, institutional and legal-cultural barriers prevented their ready implementation.
A different question is whether this low level of legal regulation of lawyers
was socially undesirable. At least one theoretically competing hypothesis would
be that lawyers rarely transcended legal limits and thus rarely gave occasion for
disbarment proceedings or lawsuits against them. Against such a possible hypothesis, however, stand two significant arguments: one from data and the other
from a solemn judgment of the bar itself. The first is a tabulation of the number
of reported American decisions dealing with legal malpractice in decades beginning in the 1790s prepared by the authors of the standard American treatise on
legal malpractice, Ronald Mallen and Jeffrey Smith.99 Their graph reflects that
the number of malpractice cases apparently remained quite flat and even fell on
a per lawyer basis until the 1960s when it began to rise sharply. Unless the underlying claims can be dismissed as consisting mainly of nuisance suits of little
substantive worth or one can hypothesize plausible reasons why lawyers in the
last four decades of the twentieth century have been careless at a rate greatly in
95. Friedman, A Histog ofAmerican Law at 648 (cited in note 8).
96. Involvement of organized bar associations in pressing professional discipline charges appears
only late in the nineteenth century. See, for example, Ex tel Colorado Bar Assn, 57 Pac 1079 (Colo 1899)
(involving state bar association in prosecution); BarAssn ofBoston 46 NE 568 (Mass 1897) (city bar association); In ir Nunn, 76 NW 38 (Minn 1898) (disbarment on information filed in the state's supreme court by
discipline committee of county bar association).
97. See Chroust, 1 The Rise of the Legal Profession in America at 157 n 65 (cited in note 14) ("Disbarments, like suspensions, were rather infrequent [in early eighteenth-century New York]").
98. See Richard L. Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales 133-34 (Blackwell 1988) (describing
laxity in nineteenth-century discipline of barristers); id at 248-49 (similar history of lax discipline of solicitors); Henry Kirk, Portraitof a Profession ch 4 (Oyez 1976) (struggle of solicitor organizations to effect significant discipline through nineteenth century).
99. See Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith, 1 LegalMalpractice§ 1.6 at 19 (4th ed 1996).
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excess of their predecessors, one must draw the conclusion that the law and its

application have changed profoundly. Second, a formal ABA report in 1970the well known "Clark Repore' named after its chair, then Justice Tom Clark of
the United States Supreme Court-found that the state of lawyer discipline in
the United States was a "scandalous situation." 100 That assessment was widely

shared.' 0'
At important points, however, during the 1960s and 1970s, forces were at
work that have led to a steep ramping-up of the levels of professional discipline
and legal malpractice. Those factors, which will be considered in a separate artide, 10 2 have coalesced during a time when the American legal profession has
been under significant stress, primarily from a vastly increasing population of
lawyers that has produced a very different demographic profile of the American
legal profession. Those and other forces, combined with significant changes in
the ideology of the legal profession, have reshaped the regulatory situation of
American lawyers.

100. ABA Special Committee on the Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations at 1 (cited in note 5). A successor ABA study of the state of lawyer discipline in the United
States indicated that progress had been made, but admitted to many deficiencies in several states. See
Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Lazer Regulationfora New Century 89-129 (1992)
(appendix providing commission's assessment of how state and national bars had responded to specific
recommendations of the earlier Clark Committee).
101. See, for example, F. Raymond Marks and Darlene Cathcart, Disipline Within the LegalProfession:
Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U Ill L Forum, 193, 228 (when disciplinary process is considered as a whole, it
appears that the legal profession is creating the appearance of self-regulation rather than engaging in selfregulation in fact). Justice Clark reportedly believed that the bar's response to his report had been tepid at
best See Eric H. Steel and Raymond T. Nimmer, Lazwers, Clients, and PrfessionalRegulation, 1976 Am F
Found Research J 919, 942 n 38 (reporting Justice Clark's assessment four years after his committee's
report that "no progress has been made to amount to anything'). See also, for example, Bayless Manning,
IfYLayerr Were Angels:A Sermon on One Canon, 60 ABA J 821,822 (1974) impact of Clark Report has been
"that of a feather dropped into a well").
102. Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalizationof Legal Ehi.s-IL The Modern Era, 14 Geo
J Leg Ethics (2001) (forthcoming).

